This article seeks to explain the attitudes of civil servants to the preparation of redesigning the civil service system. The starting point for this study is the perplexing point that the plans to reform the Lithuanian civil service system, which was designed to enhance the influence and role of top managers, resulted in the civil servants themselves as the plan's most conspicuous opponents. The article provides explanations to this puzzling situation, drawing on contractualization as the radical reform model or public management model. An attempt is made to find some support for performance contracts, as well as the objectives of rotation implementation and the creation of a higher civil service system. The article argues that civil servants may regard contracts and other managerial elements as a way of realizing other objectives in the reform that they value.
INTRODUCTION
As the Governments implement public sector reforms, opposition factors are faced that sometimes become difficult obstacles or even traps for reforms. One of negative factors related to the implementation of reforms is related to the civil servants' opposition to the reforms. This is not a typical phenomenon, but it does happen and is known for academics as a part of preparation and implementation of reform 1 . Its reasons, nature and the interests of civil servants are clearer when their opposition is towards the preparation and implementation of civil service reform. This reform obstacle is peculiar because civil servants have almost unrestricted information access and the competencies of technical expertise in contrast to other reform opposition groups. Besides, a part of them quite often become reform organizers. Of course, the participation of civil servants in contemporary reform preparation and, partly, implementation processes is eliminated by involving external experts, creating specialized and independent agencies which manage/coordinate reform implementation, or decreasing the level of bureaucratic discretion by other means. 2 But there are perhaps deeper causes for opposition to reforms. Some researchers explain resistance to reforms by the terms of administrative traditions or institutional cultures. 3 Administration tradition works as a predisposition to political-administrative decisions. It can also comprise the intentions to simulate, imitate and direct activities towards a different direction and also stop changes.
Despite the existing transformations, Saulius Pivoras emphasized the continuation of the Soviet tradition while analyzing the characteristics of Lithuanian bureaucracy from this perspective. 4 Another argument expressed by Vitalis Nakrošis also conforms to this category of predisposition(s): -The decisions of new public management doctrine often are not suitable for Lithuania.‖ 5 This is due first of all ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 2 2011 158 of the phenomenon. 10 Factors of opposition towards reforms have hardly been analyzed. However, some attention has been paid to the possible problem of civil service politicization (since 2004 Lithuania has been ascribed to the group of the least politicized systems in Eastern and Middle Europe), ways of reform implementation and choice of models 11 .
The aim of the present article is to reveal the points of view of civil servants and administrative elites towards civil service contracts as the most radical element in the Lithuanian civil service reform. This article analyses the concept of contracts and peculiarities of their use in the reform of civil service systems. The opinions of
Lithuanian civil servants and administrative elites are also going to be analyzed with respect to service contract use.
CONTRACTS IN CIVIL SERVICE
While studying reforms of civil service, most authors focus on the changes in Anglo-Saxon systems. They are most often related to the application of the elements of the New Public Management doctrine. Most studies which analyzed civil service transformations in the UK, New Zealand, the USA and Australia, contain the above mentioned themes. Mainly these works reveal the aims, models and contents are revealed, as well as discussing different aspects of results. 12 The papers state that the introduction of fixed-term staff contracts and performance contracts, as well as other elements, totally changed state service systems and created much more flexibility and mobility. In addition, the systems themselves have become more open, flexible and result-oriented after the implementation of ambitious reforms 13 . However, not all academics' evaluations are positive. Some researchers note that the contracts adapted by the top civil servants abolished administrative responsibility and influenced politicization of selection and system fragmentation. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 2 2011
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While analyzing civil service reforms in Belgium in the 1990s, researchers note that they are based on the ideas of New Public Management, and fixed-term contracts (two tenures for 6 years) formed the basis for these reforms. After almost a decade, the situation changed. In 2001, the Belgium Government decided to transform the relationship between politicians and senior civil servants on the basis of operational contracts. 16 Belgian researchers note that the results of the reforms were not apparent because the reform package was fragmentary, and its implementation was not consistent. 17 The fact that the system is not finished is confirmed by the poll that was carried out several years ago by a group of researchers; the results show that Belgium federal civil service moves towards activity management but there is no total distancing from rule-based service. Some researchers view the results and consequences of this reform positively. 19 One of the peculiarities of the Netherlands is flexibility. For instance, the model of individual performance contract is only exemplary for the Ministries. Most of them sign contracts with officials choosing acceptable elements of this model. 20 The use of performance contracts for top Danish civil servants was much smaller in scope in comparison with Belgium and the Netherlands. Performance contracts, the use of which is not obligatory, are made only with heads of agencies. 21 Researchers also note that the nature of contract use has changed over fifteen years. 22 In the Danish civil service not only narrow performance contracts, 32 It should also be noted that the attempts to create higher civil services in Slovakia and Hungary were not successful. 33 Generalizing reform studies of contract use, one can note that they reveal the transformations of several decades related to the implementations of models based on the ideas of new public management. New public management studies reveal that radical reforms (the UK and New Zealand) changed the systems of civil service by introducing flexibility and result-orientation to human resource management.
However, the conclusions of most researchers show that these reforms only partially reached their aims (or these aims were not entirely apparent) and had negative consequences related to a lack of administrative responsibility, high costs of acceptance, and contract monitoring and politicization of civil servants' roles. difficult to find models of positive practice.
LITHUANIAN CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: BUILDING EFFECTIVE INDIVIDUALIZED CONTRACTS FOR TOP MANAGERS
Contracts and rotation for senior civil servants, as the most radical elements in state control, appeared in the epicenter of civil service transformations for two reasons. First, political assumptions were favorable for such reforms. At the end of 2008, the Conservative party won the election. It followed neoliberal ideas of public sector transformation and suggested the managerial model of state transformations, as well as implementation of its commitment. 34 The analysis of the electoral program reveals that the main attempt was to change the career system. In academic and party activities he was already known for radical reform suggestions. 38 His ideas on state transformation, which indicate contract responsibility of senior civil servants and a remarkable decrease in the number of civil servants, received sharp criticism from some academics. 39 The head of the Sunset Commission suggested to him that he not interfere in the responsibilities of the Ministry of the Interior and coordinate suggestions about reforms rather than prepare models. 40 These were internal disagreements and more important reforms 36 Vitalis Nakrošis, supra note 5: 82. 37 Of course, the question of contract use in the civil service did not disappear from the reform agenda. The Department of Civil Service (henceforth DCS), the institution which is directly responsible for the preparation of the main document, was preparing the conception of civil service. In this institution, the point of view towards contracts, assessment according to result and rotation were very reserved, as the data of qualitative interview reveal. 41 Probably because of this, the Minister of the Interior reacted critically towards passive opportunism and the suggestions to carry out some small corrections of the system rather than implement a radical reform. 42 Besides, there were both objective and subjective political interests related to the transformations of personalities and subordination of the mentioned institution.
However, his attitudes towards post system model and greater flexibility while dismissing civil servants in fact corresponded to the aims indicated in the state program about the system transformation. The role of the Ministry of the Interior (henceforth, MI) were not clearly defined in the reform preparation, which allowed the PMS, or, more precisely, its working group, to take over the preparation of reform documents. The dynamics of project preparation were conditioned not only by the crossing of institutional and political interests, but also other reforms related to strategic planning, budget formation and transformations of institutional structure. Here the results of senior civil servants and the aspect of contracts were critical to successful implementation (e.g. for the implementation of strategic planning methodology) or important indirectly. 43 The first reform document, Conception of the Improvement of Civil Service, appeared in the spring of 2010. It describes the general principles of civil service improvement and development guidelines. 44 The reform organizers planned http://www.lrytas.lt/-12498786351247812444-saul%C4%97lyd%C5%BEio-komisijai-jau-art%C4%97ja-saul%C4%97lydis.htm (accessed October 1, 2011 47 In order to accomplish the proposed tasks, the method of qualitative data analysis, and semistructured interview, has been used. This research method has been chosen for the purpose of achieving greater consistency in addressing the problems at hand. Specific research questions have been formulated to specify and deepen each of the more general questions. In asking the questions provided below, attempts have been made to explore not only expressions of civil service reform initiatives, but also reasons for decisions and the contexts of that decision-making. Essential criteria for the selection of experts involved work practices in preparing reform plans or analysing/assessing Lithuanian civil service system. It was decided that a semi-structured interview had to be conducted with officers of institutions, civil servants under central government. In total, 11 respondents took part in the qualitative research. On average individual interviews last for 1 hour. The ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 2 2011
167
specialists of the Ministry of the Interior (they prepared the final text of the draft law) and external experts. 48 However, it was quite complicated to transfer the principles and model of system modernization to the instrumental level because of difficulties in defining the contents of contracts, deciding about tenure terms, etc.
The working group received a number of remarks and suggestions from the interested institutions. 49 In the reform document, the primary ideas about performance contracts were quite well developed. 50 First, it was planned that the performance contracts would be of two types: 1) between top civil servants and civil servants (performance These unfinished issues impeded the preparation of reform documents because a number of critical remarks were provided by the members of the Sunset interviews were anonymous. In this article names of respondents are not revealed, the language is not edited. 48 Commission and PMS. 51 Consultants and coordinators of the reform suggested coming back to discussions about technical questions and taking consideration to the fact that imperfect law draft would receive criticism at Seimas. However, the reform did not stop. In the autumn of 2010, the way of its implementation changed. The Government decided that improvements have to be made with respect to the limits of its competencies rather than preparing a new law project as quickly as possible. Therefore, some Government resolutions were prepared, which transformed civil servants' assessment, employment and provision of classification class. The creation of an improved assessment system became a certain test for the planned contract system. 52 This test was related to the definition of service performance results and the assessment of their implementation. This was a certain test-paper, which highlighted provisions towards one of the reform instruments.
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Practical difficulties in defining results also showed that the step towards performance contracts would not be an easy one.
At the beginning of 2011, the working group proposed a new law project on civil service. It moved away from contract details; however, the idea to create a higher civil service was retained. It can be noted that the law project did not of performance results; the discussion on assessment is also not developed.
CIVIL SERVANTS' RESPONSE TO THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM
Most contemporary researchers, focusing on reforms, concentrate on the opinionated research of politicians as customers (principals) or the high administrative elite rather than civil servants as agents. 56 Of course, it is not possible to maintain that the provisions of most system employees are not significant in the preparation or implementation of transformations. However, it is becoming a peripheral problem in the reform research.
This article is based on the main assumption that managerial reform instruments and the most important of them, performance contracts, influence negative attitudes as they limit career possibilities and decrease guarantees. Such transformations also critically influence civil servants' autonomy, behavior models and long-term satisfaction with their roles. Therefore, civil servants can take passive roles, opt out or become opportunists.
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A primary hypothesis was related to the fact that negative attitudes towards the reform depend on age and service time. Younger civil servants, who were employed a comparatively short time ago, oppose performance contracts less as the most radical means of reform. These attitudes are caused by personal experiences, lack of attachment to the system and persistent institutional cultures.
However, the attitudes of the civil servants who worked for a longer time are negative because the implementation of contracts as the means of the reform is eventually threatening to their careers.
DATA OF QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH AND METHODS
This paper analyzes the attitudes of 400 civil servants; the data was collected by internet-telephone survey in 2011. The survey sample (1000 civil servants) was The survey included questions related to attitudes towards the reform, contracts (as the most radical element of its content), and rotation. The attitudes towards the establishment of higher civil service and evaluation of top civil servants were also analyzed. In addition, the questionnaire included typical sociodemographic questions. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
The data of the survey shows (see Table 2 ) that the attitudes of civil servants towards the reform which is being prepared/implemented are relatively positive influenced the change in attitudes. This is also revealed by the survey of the Civil Service Department; its results reveal that civil servants' motivation decreased almost twice (compared to the years before the crisis) because of the decrease in financial payment, increased tension at work and pessimistic attitudes in the society regarding the current situation. 61 The data of the qualitative research reveals that the negative attitudes were formed by the first reform instrument, i.e. evaluation of civil servants according to the results. 62 Nevertheless, it seems that the significance of subjective experiences narrows the search for answers.
EXPLANATIONS OF THE PARADOX OF CIVIL SERVANTS' ATTITUDES
The results of the research regarding the attitude of civil servants towards the reform provide a puzzle, with several possible solutions. First, a different understanding about the aims of the reform conditioned the attitudes of the civil servants. For instance, their attitudes could be influenced by the popular (at least in academic discourse) idea of the current governing conception. However, the results of the survey show that this assumption is not true. When the civil servants were asked if ‗The civil service has to be reformed because it has lost contact with the society and does not fulfil its needs', they provided almost the same answers as to the question about the current reforms (these variables show a positive correlation, Spearman =0.373, P<0.001). Taken relatively, one can note that 7.2 percent respondents more were supportive of the reforms oriented towards participatory governing. However, the differences between negative attitudes were not so significant.
Another explanation can be related to the fact that civil servants are dissatisfied with the civil service system and view the proposed reform or at least its aims and some elements relatively positively. As noted by a participant of the survey, ‗The aims of the reform are nice and acceptable, only devil sometimes hides in the details.' For this, the correlation between the evaluation of the reform and managerial variables (performance contracts, rotation, performance evaluation and establishment of higher civil service) were evaluated. Statistical correlation between these variables was not identified. Even though the attitudes towards the current reform and higher civil service establishment were confirmed, the correlation is not very strong (Kendal tau-b = -0.242, P<0.001). Naturally, the establishment of higher civil service was viewed negatively by 51.3 percent of the respondents. Thus the establishment of an egalitarian body was viewed as a possibly insignificant element by a part of the respondents. However, other elements of the higher civil servant system were viewed more positively (see Table 3 ). The respondents viewed adaptation of business sector models exceptionally favorably (see Table 3 ). This was conditioned by the vague term(s) (-business sector model‖) used in the questionnaire. This paper attempts to clarify normative attitudes towards business principles, philosophy and also adaptation of vague Fixed-term contracts and top civil servants rotations were also viewed relatively favorably (see Table 3 ). One can note that rotation and contracts were viewed as a unified element (Kendall tau_b=0.619, P<0.001) without any major differences. These attitudes could have been determined by dysfunctions of top civil servants as elements of the system: big number of leading staff, politicization, communication problems, decreasing responsibility in decision-making, etc. . 65 This evaluation was viewed as twice more favorable than the annual evaluation, which was improved at the end of 2009, as the formulation of performance objectives and the evaluation of their achievement were introduced. Only 27.5 per cent of respondents answered positively to the question whether the annual formulation of performance objectives and evaluation of their achievement would improve performance quality. However, usefulness of responsibility and introduction of activity aims were viewed more positively. 36.9 per cent of respondents noted that this means will be useful in introducing more responsibility. A similar percentage of the respondents answered about the introduction of clearer activity aims. Why is this comparison important? Annual evaluations of a civil servant were the test-paper, which shows the attitudes towards a worked-out means, which seems to be useful only for a part of respondents. These explanations provide alternatives for interpretation; however, the puzzle still lacks several details. While analyzing deeper the civil servants' attitudes, it is necessary to come back to the hypothesis that was raised earlier. The attitudes towards contracts (a dependent variable) are conditioned by age and duration of service (independent variables). The analysis of survey results shows that there is no direct correlation between age groups and attitude towards contracts (see Table   4 ). The correlations, which are not very strong, can be indicated among the attitudes of different age groups towards rotation and leadership improvement based on the models of business sector. There is a correlation between the variables of service length and attitudes towards performance contracts. However, this statistical correlation is not very strong. While trying to clarify the attitudes, which preconditioned the factors, one can note that the respondents who have worked a comparatively short time in the civil service (up to 10 years), view the means of the reform more favorably than those who have worked in the system for a long time (eleven or more years). These different attitudes can be explained by several issues. First, it can appear for the civil servants who worked longer that the use of contracts can potentially limit their career possibilities and employment in the higher civil service which is being created. This idea is confirmed by the fact that the attitudes towards contracts, top civil servants rotation and establishment of the higher civil service almost coincide (see Table 1 and Table 4 ). Second, the civil servants who worked shorter can expect that the use of contracts and other managerial means can accelerate their advance in the system.
The indicated correlations show that the attitudes of civil servants towards performance contracts were preconditioned not only by views towards the elements of reform content and possible opposition towards unfavorable reforms, but also by the length of service in the system and dependence on it. However, the solution to this puzzle and the analysis of the phenomenon still lack the last element. Actually, the deep reasons determining the attitudes of civil servants remain unclear.
Nevertheless, an attempt can be made to reconstruct them on the basis of qualitative research data.
"A GOOD IDEA, BUT THE DEVIL HIDES IN THE DETAILS"
The analysis of individual interview data reveals that the attitudes of civil servants and top civil servants towards the phenomenon are not shared in common. A part of the respondents supported contracts, rotation and the establishment of higher civil service, making concessions about certain details.
Another part of the respondents doubted about the acceptability of radical reform elements, their necessity, perfection and possible obstacles of implementation. This is a very important element. However, Western civil service systems define aims of performance agreements in a flexible way, taking into consideration the specificity of the head's service. In general, attention to details shows that the respondents were very cautious about implementation efficiency. This situation shows that the appearance of the first reform documents was followed by emotions. Further reaction was the attempt to create influence using personal contacts. Suggestions on rotations received the most sensitive reaction, while the aspect of contracts with top civil servants affected the civil servants less.
One may question if there was a lack of information explaining reform ideas.
According to Maeder, it is necessary to prove the purposefulness of the reform in order for the bureaucrats not to oppose it. 79 The interview data show that around 70 events (meetings, discussions, etc.) were organized. 80 The press was writing sufficiently enough about the reforms. However, it seems that it was not enough in order to decrease opposition.
However, it seems that the fuss made by the civil servants cannot be viewed as a critical obstacle. The analysis of the interviews reveals that the opposition was faced in responsible committees of the parliament. Different politicians, who had been creating former reform, were opposing especially actively (including the leading parties). 81 In addition, the socio-economic environment was also changing in 2010. To be precise, saving was not the force influencing the civil service reform.
Finally, the analysis of the survey shows that civil servants were not opposing reforms absolutely harshly. The attitudes of civil servants and the opposition of part of them was not ‗the biggest devilish detail.'
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of theories, facts and opinions allowed the formation of a puzzle, the picture of which shows that performance contracts with top civil servants as a As the data of the qualitative research reveals, the establishment of contractual relationships determined the civil servants' opposition to the matter(s).
Its expression (criticism in the press and public discussion, direct and indirect pressing from the organizers of the reform) was apparent. Notable pressure arose from the administrative elite of the ministries and some actors, e.g. the lawyers.
This leads to the conclusion that the reformers did not have significant support from the administrative elite of the ministries. In the studies of reform preparation and implementation, this factor is viewed as critical in the implementation of transformations.
However, there is a paradox: the majority of civil servants do not express negative opinions on contracts and the implementation of other managerial reforms. In general, a significant number of the civil servants view the reform positively, as the survey data reveals. They also show that the attitudes are determined by the time of service in the system. The civil servants who work in the system for a short time view the introduction of contract relationship positively.
However, the hypothesis that this is determined by age and the attitudes related to it was not confirmed. Such results of the survey are paradoxical. It seems that they could have been determined by other factors: the objective to change based on the increasing mistrust in the civil service, the decreased pressure of the economical crisis since 2011 and non-understanding that there are alternatives to managerial reforms.
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